Two-thirds to nearly all of the pre-war Russian active fleet of the BMP-3 may have already been lost in Ukraine
The BMP-3 is a Russian Infantry Fighting Vehicle developed in the Soviet Union in the 1980s by Kurganmashzavod. It entered service in 1987, and belongs to the most heavily armed vehicles in its class. Its armament consists of the 100 mm 2A70 low-pressure cannon, the 30 mm 2A72 automatic cannon, the 7.62 mm coaxial PKT machine gun and two other 7.62 mm PKT machine guns. The BMP-3 can fire the 9M117 anti-tank missile of the 9K166-3 Basnya system (AT-12 Swinger in NATO designation) from its main cannon barrel.
The chassis of the BMP-3 adopts the configuration of the armoured combat vehicle family of Russian paratrooper units BMD with the engine installed at the rear of the chassis under the floor. The BMP-3 is fully amphibious. In the water, it is propelled by two thrusters. A dozer blade is located at the front of the vehicle to clear any obstacles. Another advantage of this vehicle is that it can be airlifted by a heavy helicopter or by a cargo plane.
At the front of the body, two infantrymen are located on either side of the driver, all together, it carries a crew of three and seven infantrymen. But in reality, for its intended use, i.e. to transport infantry inside to the line of contact, the vehicle is hardly used at all during the recent conflict started with the Russian agression in 2022. This is due to its firepower, the main advantage and the main true feature of the system, which is considered to be the greatest in its category. The BMP-3 is capable of engaging targets at a distance of 4 kilometres with an expected probability of hitting of around 80% (the M1 Abrams tank has a probability of hitting of 50% at the same distance). According to the manufacturer, all the vehicle’s weapons can fire with the same efficiency whether stationary or in motion.
There exist many versions of the BMP-3 such as the BMP-3 M1995 carrying the AT-14 Kornet ATGM. The BRM-3, a reconnaissance version with a 1PN71 thermal imaging radar, a 1PN65 image intensifier system and an I-band Tall Mike surveillance radar. The BMP-3F, a marine infantry fighting vehicle designed on the basis of the BMP-3 and intended for combat operations conducted by maritime units, border and coastal troops in the coastal zone, on the coast and during landing at sea. It differs from the standard BMP-3 in that it has increased buoyancy and stability.
The BMP-3K is a command vehicle, intended for operations as part of a unit, combat control, communication with other units and a higher command link. The main tactical and technical characteristics and the weapons are similar to BMP-3. The BMP-3K is equipped with navigation equipment, two radio stations, a receiver, an autonomous generator and a radar transponder, as well as an R-173 radio station with a communication range of up to 40 km.
The BMP-3M is an improved version with the installation of a new UTD-32T turbo engine with 660 horsepower, which surpasses the basic version in terms of mobility and firepower. It has an advanced fire control system that allows it to recognise targets and fire targeted shots at long range and at high speed. It stands out for its increased security thanks to the installation of additional armoured screens and the Arena-E active defence complex, which protects the BMP from guided and unguided anti-tank missiles and grenades.
The BREM-L is an armoured recovery vehicle, the BMP-3 Kornet-E is an anti-tank version with missile system, the BMP-3 Krizantema is another anti-tank version with two Krizantema missiles (AT-15 Springer in NATO code) and the BMP-3K Rys is a recent reconnaissance version with a 30mm cannon and a 1R-133-1 radar, designed for reconnaissance operations and special units behind enemy lines.
Experiences from Ukraine
The Russian army’s experiences with BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the current conflict in Ukraine started in 2022 by Russia, reveal both the strengths and limitations of this equipment in a modern warfare environment. Its powerful armament gives it the ability to engage various targets, from light armoured vehicles to infantry, and even low-flying helicopters thanks to a gun elevation of up to 60°. In Ukraine, testimonies and images have shown BMP-3s used as direct fire support, particularly in urban combat such as in Mariupol, where their 100 mm cannon was used to neutralise fortified positions.
With its 500hp UTD-29 engine (or improved versions such as the 660-horsepower UTD-32T in the BMP-3M), the BMP-3 offers good mobility on different terrains, including in harsh winter conditions, a strategic advantage in the Ukrainian conflict. Its amphibious capability, although less used in this context, adds to its versatility. Recent versions, delivered from 2023 onwards, have been adapted to operate effectively at low temperatures, which corresponds to Russian operational requirements for winter offensives.
As mentioned, the BMP-3 is being used beyond its intented role of infantry transport, playing a role similar to that of a light tank. This flexibility is found useful in situations where Main Battle Tanks are less available or where intermediate firepower is needed. The vehicles show specific disadvantages too. Despite frontal armour capable of withstanding 30mm shells and an additional protection kit (reactive armour and anti-drone systems on the new versions), the BMP-3 remains vulnerable to Ukrainian loitering ammunition and modern anti-tank missiles. In the summer of 2022, drones inflicted significant losses on the Russian armoured fleet, particularly on the BMP-3s, by exploiting their weaker side and rear armour.
At least 500 out of 750 estimated pre-war number has already been lost
Based on visual confirmation from reputable sources like Oryx, which tracks equipment losses using photographic or video evidence, the Russian army has lost a significant number of BMP-3s. By July 8, 2024, Oryx documented over 500 visually confirmed BMP-3 losses. Since Oryx only counts losses with visual evidence, the actual number is likely higher. Given that Russia started the war with an estimated 400–750 active BMP-3s (with additional units in storage), the Oryx figure of over 500 suggests that at least two-thirds to nearly all of its pre-war active fleet may have been lost by mid-2024, with losses likely continuing to rise into 2025. According to The Royal United Services Institute, 463 vehicles were produced in 2023.
Losses were inflicted by drones and ATGMs, but also by precision artillery, including HIMARS and Excalibur rounds, which has targeted BMP-3s in both open terrain and staging areas. Cluster munitions and high-explosive shells exploit the vehicle’s limited armor protection. Additionally, minefields have caused significant losses, particularly during Russian offensives like the one near Vuhledar in 2023, where BMP-3s were destroyed or immobilized by anti-tank mines. The vehicle’s 19-ton weight and tracked design offer some resistance, but its ammunition storage increases the risk of catastrophic explosions when hit, which is a common weakness of Russian armoured vehicles.
In response to the losses, the new BMP-3s delivered since 2023 incorporate improved explosive reactive armour (ERA), anti-drone systems, and internal reorganisation (moving the engine to the rear for better weight distribution and visibility). These adaptations aim to increase survivability against modern threats. The Russian army has adjusted its tactics too, favouring combined operations with other vehicles (such as BMD-4s or T-90 tanks) to compensate for the weaknesses of the BMP-3. The emphasis on winter deployments shows an attempt to exploit environmental conditions to reduce the effectiveness of enemy drones (their batteries).
The Russian experience with the BMP-3 in Ukraine highlights a vehicle whose firepower and mobility remain major assets, but whose design, inherited from the Cold War, struggles to fully meet the demands of a battlefield dominated by drones and precision anti-tank weapons. The ongoing adaptations and increased production demonstrate a desire to preserve its role in the Russian arsenal, but its effectiveness will largely depend on its integration into more modern and better coordinated tactics.
