The war in Ukraine as an example of the problematic nature of the effective use of mobilized civilians
The war in Ukraine has underscored not only the strategic and military differences between professional soldiers and mobilized civilians but also the complex challenges of effectively deploying these groups on the modern battlefield. Mobilizing civilians, particularly during a prolonged conflict like the war in Ukraine, raises questions regarding military effectiveness, as well as social, psychological, and logistical challenges.
Types of Military Personnel
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Professional Soldiers
Professional soldiers form the backbone of a modern army. They receive regular training, gain experience in diverse operations, and are often specialized in specific military areas. Their ability to respond swiftly to emerging threats and coordinate complex operations is invaluable. In Ukraine, professional soldiers are present in all key combat units, including elite forces, and their extensive preparation and experience enable them to adapt tactics as situations evolve. -
Reserve Soldiers
Reserve soldiers are individuals with past military careers who are no longer active members of the armed forces. They are among the first resources utilized during mobilization to replenish losses or expand forces. While quickly deployable, they may require additional training to restore readiness. -
Active Reservists
These are members of the reserve forces who regularly undergo training to maintain their military skills. This personnel type is flexible and ready for rapid deployment. Although effective on the battlefield, they may struggle with modern technologies and rapidly evolving tactics. -
Mobilized Civilians
Mobilized civilians, individuals with no prior military training, face the greatest challenges in effectiveness. In countries less sensitive to human losses, their training may be minimal or even nonexistent, leading to low or negligible combat efficiency.
Social and Psychological Aspects of Mobilization
At the outset, it is important to mention that in conditions of a high-intensity war, the reserves from the ranks of the reserve or active reserves will be quickly exhausted and sooner or later the main burden of the war will be transferred to the civilian population. The mobilisation of civilians has profound social and psychological consequences. For civilians who have never experienced military training, the transition to a military regime can be an enormous challenge. Their integration into military units is often very difficult, not only because of their technical skills but also because of their adaptation to the stressful combat conditions. This is compounded by family and social problems, as mobilised men and women often leave their families and jobs behind. Civilians may experience psychological problems such as stress, anxiety and depression, which are exacerbated by the rigours of military training and the constant danger on the battlefield. This factor can significantly affect their combat effectiveness, morale and ability to respond to stressful situations.
Mobilization should emphasize a balanced selection of mobilized classes. Maintaining a balance between young and older draftees is key to ensuring sufficient momentum and experience in new units. The war in Ukraine has shown that older age groups can be mobilized to protect prospective grades, but increasingly the focus is on younger individuals who have greater physical stamina and easier adaptation to military training. This practice has its serious negatives. Mobilization and the hypothetical loss of a significant proportion of young people of working age could trigger a serious demographic crisis in future decades.
New Units vs. Replacing Losses
Creating new units from mobilized civilians is a time-consuming process. Mobilised civilians need not only to adapt to the new military environment, but also to learn how to work with modern technologies and military systems that are now increasingly common on the battlefield, if the unit has them. An example on the Ukrainian side of the ongoing conflict is the territorial defence units (most often brigades). These are essentially light infantry without their own vehicles and artillery - not to mention tanks. Only later did the Ukrainian command focus on building new mechanized and motorized units. The training of these "backbone" brigades is often compressed by a lack of quality instructors, which can mean that the newly formed units have a lower level of readiness than the existing experienced forces. The strategy of focusing on forming new brigades may be an effort to create the illusion of a growing and strengthening army when, in reality, its average combat power is significantly declining.
On the other hand, replacing losses with frontline units that are already experienced and highly specialized may prove more effective. Significant losses can be covered by backup from the ranks of the mobilised. Such action would avoid situations that often occur on the Ukrainian side. In the case of a seasoned unit, insufficient or no replacement of losses by fresh soldiers may result in a situation where the unit in question loses its combat capability altogether and remains a unit that exists only on paper.
Another interesting observation in the use of mobilised personnel is the distribution during the partial mobilisation that Russia carried out in the first year of the war, recruiting an unspecified number of men. The use was essentially threefold: Personnel numbers were replenished in existing units which, until the mobilization, were essentially at peacetime strength. Next, new "independent" units were formed (most often motorized artillery brigades), and third, mobilization regiments were formed (also most often motorized artillery regiments). A likely reason for the formation of "separate" regiments, and not just pure brigades, may be the need for military units that can serve as a source of troops to replace losses in frontline units. Alternatively, a result of the lack of supporting weapons, equipment or specialized personnel to form the support units that are an essential part of any brigade. Quite concretely, it can also be expressed that a brigade without support and rearguard units is a "mere" regiment.
A very interesting way of replacing human losses in the army is being practiced right now by the Russian side of the conflict, which could be described as capitalist mobilisation, consisting in the recruitment of volunteers motivated by high financial rewards. Although generous 'bounty' recruitment can be a considerable burden on a state's economy to some extent, it has several advantages. The first is the avoidance of 'forced mobilisation of the conventional type', which means that the general public is not exposed to the negative effects of war on a massive scale, as is the case on the Ukrainian side. The second advantage is the fact that individuals who do get mobilised are often from marginalised groups. A typical example are individuals with debts who nodded to the army's offer with the idea of getting rid of their financial burden.
