Europe without US support: We need five years to build a defence against Russia
For their own defence, European countries currently still depend on the capabilities of the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The strength of transatlantic ties, however, is running up against the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump, who is signalling a willingness to abandon long-standing allies and agree new spheres of influence with Russia. To deter the Kremlin, a Europe without the Americans will need up to 300,000 additional troops and an increase in defence spending of at least €250 billion a year.
A Russian attack on a European Union country remains conceivable in the coming years, although specific estimates of its timing vary. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW - Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft), in its February study, gives a range of three to ten years. The main threat is posed not only by the 700 000 Russian troops in Ukraine, but also by the rapidly growing Russian arms industry. In 2024 alone, Russia produced or modernised 1,550 tanks, 5,700 armoured vehicles and 450 artillery weapons of various types. Compared to 2022, the production of tanks increased by 220% and armoured vehicles and artillery by 150%. Most of this is upgraded Soviet equipment, after which production will continue at a slower pace. The drop in production will be less significant if the fighting in Ukraine is stopped and Russian material losses on the front are halted.
The Europeans (European Union, UK and Norway) can defeat the Russian invasion army, but without US involvement, European defence will become a costly and painful affair, according to the Defense News website. "We are not really fully operational at the European level," said Sven Biscop of the Brussels-based think tank EGMONT. "That doesn't mean we can't defend ourselves, but it would be much more improvised, much bloodier and with more casualties."
In order to fill the theoretical gap after the United States, attention will need to be paid first and foremost to technical issues. While military satellite communications and unmanned reconnaissance will take less than three years to replace in Europe, it will take around five years to invest in the development of battlefield command and control, long-range strikes or the suppression of enemy air defences. As Defense News reports, five to ten years are needed to develop independent intelligence capabilities in space. "We are almost entirely dependent on U.S. intelligence for satellites and everything related to them," Biscop said. "It will take some time to develop a replacement. We're going to need a number of years."
Money plays almost the most important role in developing independent military capabilities. European defence spending needs to increase significantly from its current level of 2% of GDP to achieve military independence. The Czech Republic met the alliance's goal of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence for the first time ever last year. With current geopolitical developments, further increases in defence spending can be expected in the coming years. To create an independent European military capability, the IfW think tank proposes an increase of at least €250 billion per year at the pan-European level, rising to 3.5% of GDP at the national level.
With such an increase in European defence spending, Europe will be able to replace US aid to Ukraine. As of February 2022, this has reached €64 billion (1.6 trillion crowns), while Europe (including the UK) has provided a total of €62 billion (1.56 trillion crowns) to Kiev. In 2024, US military support amounted to €20 billion out of a total of €42 billion. To replace last year's US aid on the same scale, the EU would have to spend around €20 billion extra, a relatively insignificant 0.12% of its GDP.
More money for defence will increase the purchase price of military equipment in the short term, but in the long term unit prices will fall as the volume of orders increases. For example, Germany has ordered 105 Leopard 2 tanks in recent years at a unit price of €28 million. If Europe were to order 1 400 tanks at a time, the total order would be worth €40 billion at the same unit price. However, because of its scale and the more efficient use of production processes, a reduction in costs can be inferred. Similar savings can be achieved for drones. A good example is the announcement by the German company Helsing to produce 6 000 long-range drones for Ukraine. With such systems, the EU could match Russia's drone programmes in terms of quantity and quality.
In addition to equipment and funding, European armed forces need more people to be independent. NATO military planners anticipate that in the event of a Russian attack on a European member state, the 100,000 US troops stationed in Europe will be rapidly augmented by another 200,000. These are to be primarily US armoured forces. These forces must therefore be matched by European armies with a force equivalent to the capabilities of 300 000 US troops in mechanised and armoured units (approximately 50 new European brigades). According to IfW, Europe, including the UK, now has 1.47 million active troops. In the event of a US drawdown, each European army will have to increase its numbers by 20%.
In the event of a Ukrainian-Russian peace agreement, the Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft estimates that Kiev will require around 150,000 European troops deployed in a peacekeeping mission along the demilitarised border to effectively deter Russia. Moreover, these troops will be ready for rapid deployment at any point where Moscow decides to attack the EU.
However, the combat power of American soldiers is significantly higher than the combat power of soldiers of 29 national European armies. Large, cohesive, corps-sized American formations with a unified command and control structure also operate more effectively than NATO's unified command structure. In addition, they can rely on the support of strategic forces, including strategic air power, which European forces lack (as well as unified command). The North Atlantic Alliance counts on a US general to take command of all allied forces in a crisis. Europe therefore faces a choice: either to increase the number of troops by well over 300,000 to compensate for the fragmentation of national forces, or to find a way to quickly improve military coordination.
Even the future of the US nuclear deterrent in Europe is in doubt during Donald Trump's second presidential term. Europeans are protected by an arsenal of around 100 US nuclear missiles, many of which are located in western Germany. However, the United States may eventually withdraw these weapons too. The British newspaper The Telegraph therefore reported on the filling of such a gap by French or British-French forces: "[French] fighter jets carrying nuclear weapons could potentially be sent to Germany as the US threatens to withdraw its forces from the continent." The Telegraph estimates the size of the French arsenal at 300 nuclear weapons with the capability to be launched from the sea and air.
Changes in defence policy remain most politically viable in NATO's eastern flank, which is most exposed to the threat from Russia, and in countries with significant deficiencies in the basic elements of deterrence. IfW proposes that the additional €250 billion for European defence should be financed, at least initially, equally by the EU and member states. EU funding will provide for short-term debt for political and economic reasons (e.g. a five-year loan of 5 x 125 billion euros), with EU members committing to gradually increase their own share of spending over the period. Countries that do not spend more out of their own pockets on national defence will also receive less from the common fund. This will reset the level of defence spending, which Europeans must expect to increase permanently. Thanks to the increase in defence budgets, it will be possible to fill the gap left by the departure of the Americans, whether it be in terms of missing technical solutions, more efficient production or the recruitment of new soldiers.
